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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the feasibility of implementing the Australian model of federal
childcare policy in Canada. A historical institutionalist approach is used to examine this
feasibility by means of qualitative and comparative analyses. The distinct policy histories and
current measures of both countries are outlined and studied through the course of this paper. Its
research finds that, while Australia possesses some similarities in political structure to Canada,
their distinct socio-political contexts make much of the former’s model inapplicable to the latter.
Canadian federalism’s asymmetry and the political will of its federal units to defend powers
conceded to them make it highly unlikely for the federal government to implement one of the
most important aspects of the Australian model: a nationwide care standard for childcare
facilities. While enacting this tenet of Australian policy is untenable, this paper recommends that
federal authorities expand their existing monetary benefits for childcare and for both national and
subnational governments to maintain existing agreements on childcare provision.
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Chapter I. Introduction
For parents, access to childcare is a significant determinant of their ability to participate
in the workforce. Canadian female workplace participation continues to lag behind that of
Canadian men by a margin of nine percent, and the scale of this disparity has been consistent
from 2011 to 2021. 1 Djankov, Trumbic and Zhang have observed that lower female labour force
participation is generally tied to a disproportionate reliance on women to provide childcare. 2
They further examined this phenomenon in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in developed
nations around the world; this involved observing that Australian levels of female labour force
participation have improved and were primarily assisted by its federal government’s expanded
childcare subsidies. 3 Though introduced as a temporary measure, these increased subsidies were
delivered through the existing framework of federal childcare cost mitigation in Australia; this
was outlined by the authors in response to Canada’s relatively poorer mitigation of this
disparity. 4 While Canadian workplaces gradually re-opened with waves of vaccination and
improved epidemiological circumstances, the gap between men and women remains largely
unchanged. 5
Djankov, Trumbic, and Zhang’s observation of the Australian policy response to
childcare needs alongside this Canadian problem sparks interest due to a lack of further research
into applying this policy comparison since the COVID-19 pandemic began. Mahon and Brennan
performed comparative analyses of Australian and Canadian in-home childcare and parental

1

Statistics Canada. Table 14-10-0327-02 “Unemployment rate, participation rate and
employment rate by sex, annual.”
2
Simeon Djankov, Tea Trumbic, and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, “COVID-19 and the Gender Gap in
Advanced Economies.” VOX, CEPR Policy Portal. December 14, 2020.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Statistics Canada.
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leave regimes in 2017 to illustrate potential convergence, but events since this period have seen
large shifts in policy and room for further exploration; they also do not examine the feasibility of
applying one state’s policy to the other. Additionally, Mahon, Anttonen, Bergqvist, Brennan, and
Hobson’s convergent policy analysis of Australian and Canadian childcare policy was performed
in 2012, two Canadian federal elections and three Australian federal elections ago. 6 Their
comparative studyrests primarily in Australia having similarities to Canada in terms of political
organization and demographics, being a federation with and comparable population size. More
specifically, Australia and Canada have well-established liberal welfare systems, have highincome economies, and are politically free democracies based in the Westminster legislative
tradition. 7
This is not to say that the two states are identical; Mahon and Brennan make clear
differentiations between the two states in their findings. For example, they observe that Canadian
provinces have a greater share of jurisdiction than Australian states, and that the Australian
federal model has individual states which have a more equal level of political influence. 8
However, the existing literature making policy comparisons between the two states make it a
reasonable analysis to continue. There exists significant potential for some aspects of the
Australian federal government’s response to be transferrable to the Canadian political arena.
Despite these similarities, however, the discrepancies in historical contexts and institutional
structures may pose too significant of a barrier to any effort to transfer this policy in-full.

6

Rianne Mahon et al, “Convergent Care Regimes? Childcare Arrangements in Australia,
Canada, Finland and Sweden.” Journal of European Social Policy 22, no. 4 (2012): 419.
7
Rianne Mahon and Deborah Brennan, “Federalism and the ‘New Politics’ of Welfare
Development: Childcare and Parental Leave in Australia and Canada.” Publius 43, no. 1
(January 1, 2013): 91.
8
Ibid.
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The research approach of this paper will be qualitative and comparative in order to
examine the policy histories and present landscapes of both Canada and Australia with respect to
early childhood education and care, or ECEC. The examination will address the following
research question: is the Australian Government’s model for federal childcare policy applicable
to Canada?

Chapter II. Key Terms and Research Methods
The term ‘early childhood education and care’ (ECEC) will form the main reference for
centre-based, in-home, and other forms of childcare that take place outside of school hours.
Much of the literature utilized in the research of this paper uses the term ECEC, and this
consistency will benefit the use of this research with other available materials.
The hypothesis to be tested is that it is unlikely that a federal ECEC policy enacted in
Australia could be enacted in Canada due to significant differences in institutional structure and
political culture. This paper will test this hypothesis via a thorough examination of both state
contexts, illustrating the present ECEC regimes of Canada and Australia, as well as the historical
and institutional contexts of both regimes. Following these examinations, the central elements of
the Australian ECEC regime will be outlined to observe which elements already exist in Canada.
For elements that do not currently exist in the Canadian ECEC regime, the paper will determine
if existing barriers to these outstanding policy elements could be overcome through federal
government action. These potential barriers will include institutional structures, devolution of
powers between subnational jurisdictions, and contemporary political climate. If these barriers
are not outside the scope of Canadian federal power and feasibility, then this paper will conclude
that the Australian childcare policy model could be applied in Canada. If these barriers are
-3-

outside the scope of Canadian federal power or feasibility, then this paper will conclude that the
Australian ECEC policy model is not applicable to Canada.
Examining the feasibility of policy change between governments lends to the application
of a historical institutionalist lens. This involves a focus on understanding how the behaviours of
actors and institutions inform each other, how institutional structures explain power imbalances
in political environments, and exploring path dependence based on how institutional structures
emerge. 9 Historical institutionalism, essentially, posits that policy decisions and institutional
behaviours of the past have a substantial influence on the policy decisions that follow them. 10 As
the primary points of analysis in this study are the political structures of both Canada and
Australia and their evolution over time, this framework is applicable to the research being
conducted. Canada and Australia’s shared past in British settler colonialism and political
structure offers the opportunity to examine how much or little these two states have deviated
over time in their construction and policy decisions on ECEC - and how Canada’s subsequent
policy decisions may be informed.
This school of analysis offers several compelling perspectives that will contribute to this
paper’s work. More specifically, Peter Hall’s observations will serve as a framework to guide its
research path. Hall argues that a combination of principles from both sociological and rational
camps of historical institutionalism offer compelling explanations for institutional change. In
summary, he proposes that new policies or reforms can be enacted if the sociological context
leading to them is favorable, but the likelihood of these changes still depends on contemporary

9

Peter Burnham, Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry. Research Methods in Politics (Houndsmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 23
10

Ibid., 24
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institutional organization. 11 Hall places particular emphasis on observing the conditions of policy
and institutions that may be already in place between relevant actors, as their machinations often
inform the conditions for negotiating new agreements between them. 12
The work of Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, who take a similarly multifaceted
approach to institutional analysis, will also contribute to the examination of this case. Streeck
and Thelen emphasise that while formal institutions are important determinants of change,
practical implications of new policy are equally important to consider. 13 They further observe
that most policy change involving formal institutions does not come from sudden, momentous
exterior events, but rather from small shifts within institutions that gather other time; in addition,
conflicts between actors over institutional direction are not static but continuous “skirmishes.” 14
While the schools of rational choice - focused on the self-interest of actors - and constructivism focused on how different actors may perceive the same issue - could explain some of these
behaviours, the eclectic approaches of these authors combine these influences within a structure
that is more directly relevant to the focus of this paper's research. Thus, the historical
institutionalist approach has been determined to be the most appropriate framework.
Work focused on the study of Canadian federalism, such as the work of April Allen, will
assist in navigating negotiations between the federal government and provincial and territorial
authorities. Allen illustrates two strategic approaches that previous federal governments have

11

Peter Hall, “Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective” in
Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. (Cambrige: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 206.
12
Ibid., 213
13

Wolfgang Streek and Kathleen Ann Thelen, Beyond Continuity Institutional Change in

Advanced Political Economies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 18.
14

Ibid., 19
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taken in order to successfully achieve their policy goals, both of which are directly related by
Allen to ECEC negotiations. The first relies on framing proposed policy as merely
complementing the existing policy through more generous federal funding, or a “status-quo
justification.” 15 The second potential strategy involves the federal government conceding
supreme authority of provinces in the realm of social policy, coupled with framing increased
monetary investment as being within federal jurisdiction. 16 Allen’s explanation of these
preceding efforts at ECEC negotiations also provide historical contexts to the positions of an
important actor in Canadian federalism: the province of Quebec.
The research literature and data utilized will include primary government sources, such as
policy announcements and statistics and secondary academic sources, such as peer-reviewed
journal articles. Additionally, tertiary sources in the vein of mainstream media articles are used
for supplementary purposes to provide context that would be relevant to the public. These
sources will span between the early 2000s to the present day to gather from this necessarily wide
variety of resources.

Chapter III. ECEC Policy in Canada: History and Practice
Canada lacks a unified federal ECEC system, with individual provinces possessing their
own standards to providing these services. However, there exists a long and storied history of
activism in achieving this federal system of decentralized responsibility, and this is intrinsically
tied with Canada’s relationship with the concept of a welfare state. The history of social safety

April D. Allen, “Buying Votes, Building Identities: Federal Social Policy Responses to SubState Nationalism in Québec.” The American Review of Canadian Studies (2012),
220.

15

16

Ibid., 221
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nets in the country is more complex. The federal government has, historically, been involved in
the provision of ECEC. In 1942, the government of then-prime minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King issued an order in-council a mandate for the Ministry of Labour to provide
facilities that provide ECEC with financial assistance. 17 In essence, ECEC was subsidized to
allow women to work in industries that were deemed essential to the war effort. Access to this
subsidy disproportionately favoured women living in urban centres - where war industries were
located - and this policy was quickly repealed after the end of the Second World War as enlisted
men returned. 18 This regression is not entirely surprising for two reasons: prevailing and deeply
entrenched policy attitudes towards non-nuclear families and the infancy of the Canadian welfare
state.
Historically, Canadian welfare models were a replication of British ‘poor laws,’ meaning
that social relief in Canada was legally delegated to churches and other religious institutions until
the mid-1800s. 19 At this time, the relief provided was based on the notion of a ‘deserving poor’
where only the most unfit members of Canadian society could qualify for assistance. 20 With
respect to any measures of child support, married women were required to prove that their
husband had abandoned them and that they were not responsible for the dissolution of the
relationship, while unmarried women were obligated to pursue their children’s fathers for
support. In both cases, external assistance was entertained only as a last resort. 21 While the mid-

17

Danielle McKenzie, “A Long History of Failure: Feeling the Effects of Canada’s Childcare
Policy.” Canadian Journal Of Law And Society 29, no. 3 (2014): 399
18
Ibid, 399
19
McKenzie, 398
20
Ibid, 398
21
Shelley A.M Gavigan and Dorothy E Chunn. “From Mothers’ Allowance to Mothers Need
Not Apply: Canadian Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal Reforms.” Osgoode Hall Law
Journal (1960) 45, no. 4 (2007): 739
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1800s saw more legislative action at the federal and provincial levels to ostensibly pursue
neglectful fathers from avoiding support, Canadian women were rarely successful in their
pursuits. Indeed, Gavigan and Chunn observe that such reforms were not particularly concerned
with illustrating working, single mothers as valued members of society; instead, these were
driven by maintaining the ‘morals’ deemed inherent in a nuclear family, one that bore a working
father and a child-rearing mother that remained in the home. 22
As industrialization and the growth of urban centres began to intensify from this period
through the early 20th century, so too did the number of families that did not fit this nuclear
mold, especially impoverished immigrants and racial minorities with working mothers. This
created the perception that the nuclear family was threatened, resulting in said reforms and the
rise of ECEC-based advocacy organizations. Langford et al describe Canadian ECEC advocacy
organizations as generally fitting into one of four categories: research groups with a focus on
ECEC, unions with memberships concerned with ECEC provisions, ECEC worker organizations,
and grassroots organizations that advocate for ECEC alongside other policies concerned with
students, women, and those in poverty. 23 Some of these organizations viewed and continue to
view governments as largely antagonistic actors, acting inherently in opposition to the goals of
state intervention in ECEC. 24
The mid-to-late 20th century saw some movement towards creating a Canada-wide ECEC
system. The 1960s and 1970s were predominantly governed federally by the centrist Liberal
Party under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, whose informal confidence-and-supply agreement

22

Ibid, 738
Rachel Langford et al. “Conflictual and Cooperative Childcare Politics in Canada.”
International Journal of Child Care and Education Policy (Seoul) 10, no. 1 (2016): 3
24
Ibid, 4
23
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with the left-wing New Democratic Party brought greater attention to ECEC needs. The late
1960s saw a far greater number of women enter the workforce due to growth in the service
industry, which increased enfranchisement energized feminist movements in the country to
demand greater policy attention to maintain this.25 In response to this public pressure, the Royal
Commission on the Status of Women in Canada was formed by the Liberal government. The
Commission’s final report was published in 1970 and proposed that the government enact a
National Daycare Act in order to guide negotiations with provincial governments. 26 Instead, the
government sought to expand its existing Canada Assistance Plan, which reimbursed half of
provincial subsidies for ECEC and proposed an income-dependent scale of federal benefits for
ECEC services, without establishing national standards of care. This policy implied that ECEC
access was not an essential issue of gender equality, but rather an issue related to poverty as
many of this particular government’s policies were framed. 27 Mahon and Brennan directly
attribute the exacerbated inequality in provincial ECEC access and funding to this decision to
expand the existing Plan and leave provinces to determine their own rates of service expansion. 28
They also note that the expanded Plan only extended partial coverage of operating costs to nonprofit ECEC centres, which contributed to the overall majority of Canadian ECEC facilities
being non-profit. 29
By the 1980s, the United States and the United Kingdom saw right-wing governments
formed under platforms of reduced state intervention by previous governments, and Brian
Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative Party would follow suit in 1984. In the case of ECEC, the

25

Mahon and Brennan, 97
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
26
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primary arguments against establishing a national standard largely centered on the perceived
intrusion on families’ freedom to determine the type of care best-suited for their children, and the
desire to preserve an ECEC system based on free enterprise. 30 The result was exacerbated
regional disparities in care standards. Teghtsoonian, for example, notes that some provinces
required all ECEC staff have prior ECEC work experience or undergo training, while others did
not require either for any staff. 31 As these disparities become increasingly difficult to ignore,
Mulroney’s government announced a National Child Care Strategy in 1987. The Strategy had
three main components, the first two being ECEC tax incentives for parents totaling $2.3 billion
and the Child Care Special Initiatives Fund of $100 million. The third component, the Canadian
Child Care Act (Bill C-144), outlined a scheme of cost-sharing between the federal government
and provincial governments for 50% of operational costs and 75% of space-building costs under
provincial initiatives for ECEC facilities. 32 However, the Strategy was conspicuous in not
outlining any federally imposed standards of ECEC that provinces would have to follow in order
to qualify for this funding. 33
Many Canadian ECEC organizations, especially the Childcare Advocacy Association of
Canada (CCAAC), strongly opposed the Strategy on account of its proposed inclusion of forprofit organizations. 34 The Mulroney government would defend the absence of federal standards
based on ECEC administration being under provincial jurisdiction; the government stated that its

30

Katherine Teghtsoonian, “Institutions and Ideology: Sources of Opposition to Federal
Regulation of Child Care Services in Canada and the United States.” Governance 5, no. 2 (April
1, 1992): 206
31
Ibid, 203
32
Ibid, 206
33
Ibid.
34
Langford et al, 4
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own legal advice concluded that such measures would be unconstitutional. 35 The opposition
Liberal Party and New Democrats contended that the Mulroney government could still establish
federal ‘objectives’ in ECEC service quality in order to circumvent this. Direct analogies were
made to the Canadian health care system, in which provinces receive federal health care funding
on the basis that their systems are “accessible; [...] comprehensive; [...] universal; [...] portable;
and [...] publicly administered.” 36 The Mulroney government would content that Bill C-144's
preamble illustrating “the need to improve the availability, affordability, quality, and
accessibility of child care” was sufficient; the government faced strong internal opposition to any
federal standards beyond this statement, exacerbated by the concurrent Meech Lake Accord
negotiations. 37 These negotiations involved interprovincial debate regarding the government’s
intentions to further decentralize the federal system with respect to heated topics like Quebec’s
status in the federation, and the Progressive Conservatives had little appetite for an additional
arena of contention. 38 This internal conflict effectively doomed any movement within the
Mulroney government for widening the Framework, which was eventually abandoned.
The next two decades were defined by the Liberal Party’s return to government under
Jean Chretien and later Paul Martin. The proposed ECEC policies were framed as a means of
combatting poverty once more, but particularly framed at reducing poverty amongst Canadian
children. 39 The government designed its National Child Benefit to partially subsidize ECEC
services for low-income families but allowed provincial authorities to reclaim this amount on

35

Teghtsoonian, 206
Ibid, 207
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid, 212
39
Mahon and Brennan, 98
36
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their own authority in order for fund initiatives for early childhood development. 40 This reflected
the Chretien and Martin governments’ views of ECEC as only one part as a wider platform for
childhood development, resulting in very marginal progress with respect to ECEC access and
affordability. Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party 2006 federal election win would precede the
abandonment of these marginal measures and virtually no federally directed action on ECEC
policy for the following nine years. 41
In 2015, the Liberals returned to government under Justin Trudeau’s leadership and
would publish their Multilateral Early Learning and Child Care Framework in 2017. The
Framework largely serves to illustrate the guiding values of the current federal government in
negotiating potential ECEC agreements with provinces and territories – such as affordability of
care, promoting innovation, and inclusive spaces – but also outlines important insights into
where federal roles begin and end with respect to ECEC policy. Paramount among these is the
scope which the federal government sought to assist provinces and territories; these were ECEC
programs and facilities regulated by these governments “including, but not limited to, regulated
child care centres, regulated family child care homes, early learning centres, preschools and
nursery schools.” 42 These investments are limited by the Framework to these services provided
to children under the age of six, and the federal government’s position has been that individual
provinces and territories will continue to administer their own ECEC standards. 43 By its own
admission, the federal government acknowledges that the “primary responsibility” in developing

40

Ibid.
Ibid.
42
“Multilateral Early Learning and Child Care Framework.” Employment and Social
Development Canada, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-socialdevelopment/programs/early-learning-child-care/reports/2017-multilateral framework.html#h2.2.
43
“Multilateral Early Learning and Child Care Framework.”
41
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and executing these standards falls to provincial and territorial authorities, rather than the federal
government establishing a concrete national standard of ECEC. 44
Trudeau’s government and the Government of Ontario announced a $13.2 billion funding
deal over six years for ECEC in March 2022. 45 While proposed in some form since the
government’s election in 2015, the COVID-19 pandemic provided an important impetus in
forming concrete actions through the growing disparity for parents returning to the workforce,
especially mothers. With this announcement, the federal government completed year-long
negotiations with all provinces and territories with the intention of providing access to $10-perday ECEC services for Canadians by 2026. The individual terms of these vary widely; in the
case of Ontario, its deal with the federal government maintains Ontario’s existing ECEC tax
credit program and is the only provincial deal to stipulate a financial review in the third year of
funding to address any potential funding shortfalls. 46 Others, like that of Manitoba, have funding
deals that set hourly minimum wages for ECEC workers. 47 The impact timelines for individual
agreements also vary. The Northwest Territories, for example, saw the average cost of ECEC
services halved immediately while other provinces expect this level of decrease to occur over

44

Ibid.
“News Release: $13.2 Billion Child Care Deal Will Lower Fees for Families.” Ontario
Newsroom - Government of Ontario, March 28, 2022.
https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1001868/132-billion-child-care-deal-will-lower-fees-for
families.
46
“News Releases: Canada-Manitoba Early Learning and Child-Care Agreement to Strengthen
Child Care and Support Recruitment, Retention of Early Childhood Workforce across
Manitoba.” Province of Manitoba, February 22, 2022.
https://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?item=53497.
47
Ibid.
45
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several years. 48 Every agreement, however, involves the federal government providing each
province and territory with funding to subsidize ECEC costs and new space construction.
With different provincial systems of funding and standards leading up to these
negotiations, serious gaps in ECEC delivery and quality continue to be apparent across Canada.
Utilizing the recently-emerged term of ‘childcare deserts,’ Prentice and White find that lowincome neighbourhoods in Canadian cities have far lower access to licensed ECEC facilities. In
some cases, high-income neighbourhoods in the same city have ten-times as many facilities in
similarly populated areas that are low income. 49 For those who can find spaces, the annual cost
of ECEC can be up to $21,000 per child for parents and living in Toronto or Vancouver. 50
Another significant regional variation is the share of for-profit and non-profit ECEC faculties. 70
per-cent of Canadian ECEC facilities are non-profit, with the remaining 30 per-cent being forprofit. For-profit care is absent in most of the territories while most facilities in Newfoundland
and Labrador are for-profit, for example. 51
Relief for these high costs is also dependent on one’s province or territory. Quebec is
viewed as the most generous in its provision of ECEC; up to 55% of children can qualify for
low-cost care through provincial tax credits. 52 Allen explains this particular approach with the
observation that Quebec’s history of European-style welfare systems have become intrinsic to
the identity of the province, and this approach has been a point of pride and a defining aspect of

48

“Child Care in Canada: A Look at the Deals Signed by Each Province and Territory.” Global
News, March 28, 2022. https://globalnews.ca/news/8715816/child-care-deals-canada/.

49

Susan Prentice and Linda A White. “Childcare Deserts and Distributional Disadvantages: The
Legacies of Split Childcare Policies and Programmes in Canada.” Journal of International and
Comparative Social Policy 35, no. 1 (2019): 61
50
Ibid, 62
51
Ibid, 63
52
Ibid, 62
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Quebecois national identity. 53 Most provinces provide some fee relief, but qualification often
requires the parent or guardian to be significantly below the poverty line while working, training
for new employment, or being in education; in some provinces, minimum or co-payments must
be paid even by those who qualify for the greatest relief. Some provinces further stipulate that
ECEC subsidies can only be used towards non-profit facilities. 54 The Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives reported that those who qualify for the most generous provincial subsidies may still
pay in excess of $400 in fees for each child in a space on account of inadequate direct funding
levels and relatively restrictive conditions for co-pay qualification. 55 There does exist a federal
Child Care Expense Deduction, but higher-income families qualify for the most relief through
this scheme; the broader and unindexed Canada Child Benefit, which can provide up to $6,400 in
tax credits, is less likely to be utilized by low income families because of its long confusing
application process.

56

From a historical institutionalist perspective, Canada’s federal government involvement
in ECEC funding has been defined by ‘policy drift.’ This refers to a long history of disputes
between provincial and federal governments leaving a keen sense of reluctance to pursue
coordinated social policies outside of pensions and healthcare. 57 The strategies described by
Allen have also been on full display through this; in particular, concessions to provincial
authority have been central to the current government’s Framework and the successful
negotiation of ECEC agreements with provincial and territorial authorities. Canada’s overall
structure, in which the federal government holds the greatest financial power and provinces hold

53

Allen, 222
Prentice and White, 63
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid, 66
57
Ibid, 68
54
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extensive jurisdictional powers, seems to exacerbate this. These aspects of jurisdictional conflict
in Canada will be revisited later in this paper to illustrate the potential for future policy
exploration in the framework of Australian ECEC policy. In order to

Chapter IV. ECEC Policy in Australia: History and Practice
The federal government of Australia began direct ECEC policy intervention in 1972,
although as Harris illustrates, its roots begin much earlier. 58 From the 1880s to the 1910s, both
women’s and workers’ rights were the focal points of Australia’s public consciousness and
represented the first large-scale questioning of its structural inequalities. More specifically, the
reality of women and children’s economic reliance on male caregivers was the source of
significant anxiety amongst the burgeoning first wave of Australian feminism. Rather than
achieve the status of equality with Australian men, activist leaders like Louise Lawson sought to
achieve economic and social independence from them. 59 Indeed, she notes that Australia’s status
as a former British penal colony transplanted much of the same structures which privileged
white, Protestant men in Britain. With Australian women bearing no right to the custody of their
children or the ownership of property, they and their children were extremely vulnerable to male
violence; in a single month in the 1890s, a Sydney refuge admitted over six-hundred children and
over 1,011 women. 60
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Despite these wide structural inequalities, the primary avenue for Lawson and other
activists was government intervention. Beyond a goal of achieving suffrage, the Australian state
was viewed by Australian activists as a vehicle towards their enfranchisement with a view to its
evolution into a “maternalist welfare state.” This state framework involves the security of women
and children being institutionally guaranteed; as the Australian state maintained these structures
reducing the opportunity of women and children, activists saw the state as being responsible for
rectifying its inequalities. 61 Even in the embryonic form that such activism found itself in the
1890s, a movement for publicly funded ECEC was already being championed. Inspired by
philosopher Friedrich Fröbel’s development of the kindergarten model in Germany and the
subsequent American ‘free kindergarten’ movement, Anderson advocated for free and early
access to ECEC as an answer to not only the education and well-being of impoverished children,
but also the reduction of burden for working women. 62 This was coloured heavily by the realities
of the severe economic depression in Australia as the 19th century ended, with activist Maybanke
Anderson finding that working women often had little choice but to leave their own children
unattended as they worked in order to provide for them. Anderson founded the country’s first
free kindergarten in a particularly poor Sydney suburb in 1896 with partial funding from the state
of New South Wales. By the time of her death in 1927, fifteen were running in other
disadvantaged Sydney neighbourhoods and a Free Kindergarten Union had been established in
New South Wales. 63
Harris writes that these early victories for Australian ECEC lay in the fact that the private
needs of Australian women were successfully framed as being part of the public interest. Much
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of this is attributed to state funded ECEC being promoted as a multi-pronged solution from the
state to a variety of social problems in Australia. Beyond being a ‘women’s issue:’ quality
education, poverty reduction, and epicenters for greater social cohesion were all listed as
intrinsic benefits resulting from the establishment of these institutions. 64 Furthermore, she argues
Australian activists framing the state as both the source of and solution to these structural
inequalities was a radical model for social change at that time, laying the foundation for
achieving more expansive reforms. 65
These expansive reforms were not immediate. For most of the 20th century, ECEC in
Australia was largely left to “a mix of philanthropic organizations and small private businesses”
as states maintained individual regulation standards owing to their jurisdictional advantage. 66
Public ECEC services were also based on income and were structured to discourage low-income
beneficiaries of ECEC from benefiting as they earned more from any state funding. By the 1960s
and 1970s, second-wave feminists in Australia had revived the conversation regarding the extent
of ECEC provisions. In the process, these second-wave feminists cooperated with a wide
spectrum of public stakeholders including parents, ECEC workers, female politicians and civil
servants, and trade unions. 67 The resulting social movement advocated for a universal, federally
funded model of ECEC, with the eclectic nature of this movement citing the wide social benefits
that would arise because of its institution. Mahon et al further note that Australia’s strong labour
and social democratic movements through the century provided a social base for increased
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government intervention, despite the Australian Labor Party residing on the opposition benches
from 1945 until the 1970s. 68 When elected in 1972, the Labor government of Gough Whitlam
reshaped the ECEC Act that had been passed by the lame-duck departing government. While the
original Act had proposed a voucher system, the Whitlam government “instead offered capital
and operating grants limiting these to non-profit, centre-based ECEC, provided by qualified
staff.” 69 Whitlam utilized Section 81 of the Australian constitution, which enables the federal
government to distribute its own tax revenue, as a means of providing federal fiscal support to
various levels of government and ECEC institutions while avoiding conflict with the jurisdiction
of individual Australian states, who still primarily funded ECEC facilities. Whitlam’s successor,
Bob Hawke, would further introduce federal ECEC fee relief in 1984 and expand this relief to
commercial ECEC centres in 1990. 70
Federal Australian ECEC policy falls under the responsibility of the Department of
Education, Skills and Employment. Standards in ECEC are regulated nationally by the National
Quality Framework (NQF), covering daycares and after-school facilities nationally and
preschools outside the states of Western Australia and Tasmania. Introduced in 2012 to
consolidate individual state standards for certification and care quality, the Framework is
administered by the Australian Children’s Education and Care Quality Authority (ACECQA)
created in conjunction with the Framework. 71 Within the Framework is a National Quality
Standard (NQS) to certify the qualifications of Australian ECEC facilities must meet to operate.
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Measured on a five-point qualitative scale from ’excellent’ to ’significant improvement
required,’ the NQS includes the following areas:
•

Educational program and practice;

•

Children’s health and safety;

•

Physical environment;

•

Staffing arrangements;

•

Relationships with children;

•

Collaborative partnerships with families and communities; and

•

Governance and leadership. 72

The Framework also provides pre-approved learning curriculum that facilities may institute to
automatically meet the educational program and practice standard. While a national standard, the
Framework is enforced and regulated by the educational departments of individual Australian
states and territories. 73 In their examination, Logan, Press, and Sumsion observe that Hawke’s
expansions of funding helped to create today’s ECEC landscape in Australia, “a predominantly
for-profit childcare sector” in which funding is dependent on compliance with federally
mandated standards. 74 Since the 1990 fee expansion relief in particular, the mixed model of
ECEC provision in Australia has been consolidated. For-profit facilities operate alongside
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publicly funded facilities. In general, for-profit facilities are dominant throughout the country
and can expand their operations and spaces due to the regular subsidization of ECEC.
In terms of funding, parents and guardians may apply for the Child Care Subsidy, which
replaced the Child Care Benefit and Child Care Rebate in 2018. 75 Those applying must have
children under 13 years of age that do not attend high school (or 14 to 18 during high school, if
the child has a disability) with full immunization. Funding is provided directly to ECEC facilities
to reduce fees paid by parents or guardians based on six income tiers; for reference, the median
Australian household gross income is A$116,584 as of 2018. 76 Those with a family income of
A$70,015 or less receive the greatest fee subsidy at 85%; subsequent income tiers gradually
reduce the subsidy to 50% for families annually earning between A$175,015 and A$254,305
with those earning greater than A$354,305 generally ineligible for any subsidy. 77 Funding is also
dependent on the activity level of parents or guardians based on expected time spent on
’recognized activities’ every two weeks, including paid or unpaid work and schooling; unpaid
leave periods are also recognized, but are restricted to maximum time periods. 78 Subsidies for
ECEC are provided to families using centre-based care, family daycares, after-school hours care,
and in-home care; however, in-home care applications have separate criteria.

Chapter V. Application of Australian ECEC Policy to Canada
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Before the application of Australian ECEC model is to be compared to Canada, it is
useful to ensure its central aspects are made clear. The model in question can summarized as
follows:
•

a mixed ECEC sector, comprised of both for-profit and public facilities,

•

ECEC costs federally subsidized to consumers directly, with low-income families
qualifying for the greatest relief; and

•

federally-mandated standards for ECEC facilities, administered by subnational
jurisdictions.

These individual pillars of policy will be individually examined to observe their relevance and
feasibility to the Canadian case. For those that do not already exist in the Canadian context, the
potential for their implementation will be measured against the historical precedents for policy
change in Canada and the present climate studied previously in this paper.
To begin, the Canadian ECEC sector already includes for-profit and non-profit facilities.
While market share does vary regionally, they are both ubiquitous on a national scale as they are
in the Australian ECEC sector. In terms of fee relief, the Canada Child Benefit and differing
provincial and territorial tax rebates existed prior to and following the completion of the federal
government’s negotiations, but the national benefit’s maximum of $6,400 represents less than
30% coverage of the current cost of ECEC in Toronto and Vancouver compared to potential 85%
fee coverage for low-income Australian parents and caregivers. This can be attributed to the
Canadian federal government’s negotiating framework on financial supports for facilities in
order to lower upfront cost to parents and caregivers. This is a direct contrast to the Australian
policy of focusing fee relief and subsidies to consumers, especially those who have a lower
income. While the existence of the federal benefit means it would be possible to replicate the
- 22 -

levels of consumer subsidy seen in Australia, this is clearly not part of the current federal
government’s agenda.
The most significant obstacles to implementing the Australian model arise when
examining the context of federal ECEC policy in Canada. Over 30 years in the political
wilderness passed for the federal government to institute a new framework for provincial ECEC
funding, but the 2017 Multilateral Early Learning and Child Care Framework remains very
similar in principle to the Mulroney government’s proposed National Child Care Strategy of
1987. Importantly, it directly avoids instituting substantive quality and delivery standards on
provincial and territorial authorities and seeks to entertain existing measures at these levels
instead. Even within this quite limited framework, skepticism has emerged in Ontario over
funding guarantees for ECEC centres among for-profit centre owners. According to these
owners, the for-profit ECEC industry is already highly regulated at the provincial level and said
funding agreements effectively treat these establishments like state-owned enterprises. 79
Considering that the Framework is seeking to reimburse construction costs and ’reasonable’
levels of rent, it would not be unreasonable to speculate the level of furor that could be incurred
were the federal government to impose new standards of licensure for ECEC centres in any one
province or territory, let alone thirteen.
The current Liberal federal government may not also be in a strong position to negotiate
this level of change. With minority status in the House of Commons, its policy is confined by a
confidence-and-supply agreement with the NDP and is vulnerable to potential confidence votes.
Additionally, the differences in agenda between provinces and territories on ECEC policy are the
79
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result of decades of internally-developed political cultures that are not necessarily in agreement.
Quebec’s generous ECEC policy, for example, is guided by its inclination towards a Europeanstyle welfare system. This model is eschewed in provinces like Alberta, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan, where an emphasis on free-market models of social services are mainstream
approaches. As illustrated by Allen, Quebec and these Western provinces have contentious
relationships with the federal government across history and during the present day when federal
policies may compromise their own autonomy, the former on account of nationalist sentiments
and the latter’s phenomenon of ‘Western alienation.’ These make any imposition of federal
standards upon provinces a potential setting for elevated levels of conflict, which the present
ECEC agreements directly sought to avoid.
One only needs to look to the case of health care at-large to view what tensions may arise
when the federal government seeks to impose such conditions for funding. While the Canada
Health Act, 1985 precludes the previously mentioned broad standards for provincial and
territorial funding from Ottawa, the Act and its predecessors were largely dependent on these
lower levels of government having the ability to set their own standards of care beyond basic
services. 80 Attempts by the federal government to implement more rigid conditions for health
care funding have largely been met with disquiet from provincial governments and
disincentivized attempts to do so. 81 The reasoning behind using this example is that the division
of powers over public health in Canada has already been readily tested. Federal authorities have
informal constitutional authority regarding the spending of its tax revenue - as is the case in
Australia - and formal authority over particular groups like First Nations and Inuit health via
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section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867; on the other hand, provincial authorities are granted
wide authority via section 92 over how physicians are licensed, the limits on public coverage of
services, and standards of delivery. 82 When provinces and territories already possess stringent
powers over their own industrial standards and have shown clear will to defend them, they are
unlikely to surrender an authority which the federal government has already conceded to them.
For a legally untested standard like ECEC, the chances of success for imposing a national
standard of care are quite low. While the specific constitutional provisions mandating provincial
authority over ECEC are unclear, repeated federal concessions that ECEC standards fall to
provinces and territories would undermine most constitutional arguments that more authoritative
conditions could be imposed by the federal government. Here Hall’s historical institutionalist
framework is particularly relevant; recall his observations on the importance of agreement
between actors on policy enaction. In the case of ECEC negotiations in Canada, it is evident that
all involved levels of government have formed a clear consensus; ECEC regulation and licensure
falls outside federal authority. To usurp this would represent a dramatic about-face on the part of
the federal government, especially after over a year of negotiations based upon this consensus.
With Ontario’s agreement renewal being conditional on a specifying a future review, this would
not only risk the federal government’s negotiating position for national standards, but also the
continued existence of the present agreement and potentially those made with other provinces
and territories.
While Canada’s federal government does possess the authority to subsidize the cost of
ECEC services to consumers, the presence of substantive, federal quality standards is an
essential component of the Australian model. The lack of strong federal standards for ECEC
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facilities, on the other hand, has been essential to the Canadian federal government’s framework
for ECEC provision, as well as its negotiations for implementing it. With the imposition of these
standards upon provincial authorities unfeasible, this makes the Australian model of ECEC
policy substantially inapplicable to Canada.

Chapter VI. Recommendations and Conclusion
The goal of the research undertaken in this paper was to test the potential of replicating
Australia’s model of federal ECEC policy in Canada. In analyzing the two paths of support
taken, it became clear that substantial differences in historical context and political economy
have informed the paths both the Canadian and Australian federal governments have taken to
address accessibility and cost of ECEC services. Similarities exist in the presence of both forprofit and non-profit facilities resembling that of Australia and the potential for direct federal
consumer subsidies existing. However, it has been found that Canada’s federal government does
not possess the means or position to impose national standards to the degree that Australia’s
federal government has. An attempt to do so by the Canadian federal government would run
contrary to the spirit of the agreements recently made with provinces and territories on ECEC
policy, and these units of government would almost certainly react adversely. The progress made
through these agreements, as well as their very existence, would be placed at risk in doing so.
With the Australian model being unlikely to be implemented fully and feasibly in Canada, it is
reasonable to accept the hypothesis outlined by this paper.
This does not mean that a more concerted effort is outside the scope of Canadian federal
authorities in other areas. A more generous Canada Child Benefit, with increased campaigns of
awareness for lower-income Canadians, would more closely resemble part of the Australian
- 26 -

model of subsidization. The Child Care Expense Deduction disproportionately benefitting highincome families is also an area in which the federal government can adjust its policy, either
through restructuring the Child Care Expense Deduction or eliminating it in favour of an
expanded Canada Child Benefit. Either of these would not infringe on the authority of provincial
and territorial governments and would represent a more equitable landscape for Canadian parents
and caregivers alongside the individual funding agreements for provincial and territorial ECEC
sectors.
While the complete Australian model is unfeasible in the Canadian context, it is
important that both a foundation of trust and exchange of interests are maintained between
federal, provincial, and territorial authorities. Hall repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of parties
to substantial institutional change actively engaging in such processes, and that institutional
change is often incremental with an emphasis on experimentation and tinkering. 83 The
agreements made between the federal government and its provincial and territorial counterparts
speak to this; they are highly individualized in order to account for the collective interests of both
levels of government involved and open the door to future discussions on the subject. Any future
federal government that wishes to implement further changes in ECEC accessibility and
affordability would have these agreements to revisit with provincial and territorial authorities,
which is a far more advantageous position than having no framework whatsoever. They represent
the most significant platform for ECEC policy change in decades of Canadian politics in spite of
their flaws, and to negate them simply because they do not fit the comparative model used in this
study would be highly reductive. It is for these reasons that existing ECEC agreements between
federal and provincial and territorial governments should be maintained for the foreseeable

83

Hall, 218
- 27 -

future, and that all levels of government continue to further the best possible care standards for
future generations of Canadians.

- 28 -

BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Administrative Arrangements Order made on 5 December 2019 with effect from 1 February
2020” (Canberra: 2020), 12. Australian Government
Allen, April D. “Buying Votes, Building Identities: Federal Social Policy Responses to Sub-State
Nationalism in Québec.” The American Review of Canadian Studies 42, no. 2 (2012):
210–235.
“Assessment and rating process.” ACECQA. September 2020. Accessed May 10, 2021. https://a
cecqa.gov.au/assesment/assessment-and-rating-process
Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland Lutz, Wyn Grant, and Zig Layton-Henry. Research Methods in
Politics, 2nd ed. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
“Child Care in Canada: A Look at the Deals Signed by Each Province and Territory.” Global
News, March 28, 2022. https://globalnews.ca/news/8715816/child-care-deals-canada/.
“Child Care Subsidy” Services Australia. May 26, 2019. Accessed July 1, 2021. https://www.ser
vicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/services/centrelink/child-care-subsidy
“Child Care Subsidy - Recognised Activities.” Services Australia. March 13, 2019. Accessed
July 1, 2021. https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/services/centrelink/childcare-subsidy/how-much-you-can-get/your-activity-level-affects-it/recognised-activities.
“Child Care Subsidy - Your income can affect it.” Services Australia. April 22, 2022. Accessed
May 10, 2022. https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/your-income-can-affect-child-caresubsidy?context=41186
Djankov, Simeon, Tea Trumbic, and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang. “COVID-19 and the Gender Gap in
Advanced Economies.” VOX, CEPR Policy Portal. December 14, 2020. Accessed January
10, 2021. https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-and-gender-gap-advanced-economies
Fenech, Marianne, Miriam Giugni, and Kathryn Bown. “A Critical Analysis of the National
Quality Framework : Mobilising for a Vision for Children Beyond Minimum
Standards.” Australasian Journal of Early Childhood 37, no. 4 (2012): 5.
Gavigan, Shelley A.M, and Dorothy E Chunn. “From Mothers’ Allowance to Mothers Need Not
Apply: Canadian Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal Reforms.” Osgoode Hall Law
Journal (1960) 45, no. 4 (2007): 739
Hall, Peter A. “Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective.” Chapter.
In Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, edited by James
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, 204–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- 29 -

Harris, Nonie. “Radical Activism and Accidental Philanthropy: The Impact of First Wave
Feminist Activism on the Later Construction of Child Care Policies in Australia and the
United States of America.” Women’s Studies International Forum 31, no. 1 (2008): 42–52.
um 31, no1 (2008): 45
Langford, Rachel, Susan Prentice, Brooke Richardson, and Patrizia Albanese. “Conflictual and
Cooperative Childcare Politics in Canada.” International Journal of Child Care and
Education Policy (Seoul) 10, no. 1 (2016): 1–20.
Mahon, Rianne, Anneli Anttonen, Christina Bergqvist, Deborah Brennan, and Barbara Hobson.
“Convergent Care Regimes? Childcare Arrangements in Australia, Canada, Finland and
Sweden.” Journal of European Social Policy 22, no. 4 (2012): 419–431.
Mahon, Rianne, and Deborah Brennan. “Federalism and the ‘New Politics’ of Welfare
Development: Childcare and Parental Leave in Australia and Canada.” Publius 43, no. 1
(January 1, 2013): 90–108.
McGinn, Dave. “In Ontario, Owners of for-Profit Daycares Are Reluctant to Join Federal ChildCare Deal.” The Globe and Mail, June 13, 2022.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ontario-child-care-deal-2/.
McIntosh, Greg (1998). "Childcare in Australia: current provision and recent developments".
Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library.
McKenzie, Danielle. “A Long History of Failure: Feeling the Effects of Canada’s Childcare
Policy.” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 29, no. 3 (2014): 397–412.
Newberry, Susan, and Deborah Brennan. “The Marketisation of Early Childhood Education and
Care (ECEC) in Australia: A Structured Response.” Financial Accountability &
Management 29, no. 3 (2013): 233.
“News Release: $13.2 Billion Child Care Deal Will Lower Fees for Families.” Ontario
Newsroom. Government of Ontario, March 28, 2022.
https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1001868/132-billion-child-care-deal-will-lower-fees-forfamilies
“News Releases: Canada-Manitoba Early Learning and Child-Care Agreement to Strengthen
Child Care and Support Recruitment, Retention of Early Childhood Workforce across
Manitoba.” Province of Manitoba, February 22, 2022.
https://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?item=53497
Prentice, Susan, and Linda A. White. “Childcare Deserts and Distributional Disadvantages: The
Legacies of Split Childcare Policies and Programmes in Canada.” Journal of International
and Comparative Social Policy 35, no. 1 (2019): 59–74.

- 30 -

Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Ann. Thelen. Beyond Continuity Institutional Change in
Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Teghtsoonian, Katherine. “Institutions and Ideology: Sources of Opposition to Federal
Regulation of Child Care Services in Canada and the United States.” Governance 5, no. 2
(April 1, 1992): 197–223.
Thorpe, Karen, Emily Westwood, Elena Jansen, Ryan Menner, Sandy Houen, and Sally Staton.
“Working Towards the Australian National Quality Standard for ECEC: What Do We
Know? Where Should We Go?” The Australian Educational Researcher 48, no. 2 (March
24, 2020): 229. 35
“The Health of Canadians, the Federal Role, Vol. Five Principles and Recommendations for
Reform, Part I.” Ottawa: the Standing Committee, 2002.
“Unemployment rate, participation rate and employment rate by sex, annual.” Statistics Canada.
Table 14-10-0327-02 DOI: https://doi.org/10.25318/1410032701-eng
“Survey of Income and Housing, User Guide, Australia, 2017-18.” Australian Bureau of
Statistics, June 2019. Accessed 1 July 2021.

- 31 -

VITA AUCTORIS
NAME:

Nikolas Anthony Prsa

PLACE OF BIRTH:

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

YEAR OF BIRTH:

1997

EDUCATION:

St. Joseph’s Catholic High School, 2015
University of Windsor, BA[H], 2019
University of Windsor, MA, 2022

- 32 -

